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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to privacy and autonomy, while not explicitly stated
in the United States Constitution, has been created by the courts
out of interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,1 which states,
“[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”2 The right to autonomy protects the
workplace from sexual harassment, which is a form of sexual
discrimination.3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows for
retaliation claims where “the employee’s submission to the
1. Personal Autonomy, LII / LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, www.law.corn
ell.edu/wex/personal_autonomy (last visited Sept. 25, 2017) (The right to
autonomy and privacy has grown out of the liberty interest as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
2. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employment agency . . . to discriminate against, any individual
because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . .”); Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–66 (1986) (holding that “a plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has
created a hostile or abusive work environment” without showing an economic
effect on the plaintiff's employment).
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unwelcome advances was an express or implied condition for
receiving job benefits or that the employee’s refusal to submit to the
supervisor’s sexual demands resulted in a tangible job
detriment[.]”4
In the case of Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., the plaintiff,
Lucille, was employed for fourteen years as a machine operator. 5
After returning from medical leave for breast enhancement surgery,
which Lucille chose to keep confidential, Lucille’s supervisor asked,
“Why didn't you tell me you were getting new tits? When do I get to
see them?” 6 He also attempted to look down her shirt, but Lucille
shoved his hand away saying, “that’s enough, Don.”7 The following
day, the supervisor removed Lucille from her usual machine, and
instead placed her on a difficult to handle manual machine.8 He told
a coworker that he was punishing her for refusing to “show [him]
her tits.”9 Lucille filed two claims for sexual harassment stemming
from these instances.10 However, the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant on both counts.11
Would this negative outcome for Lucille have been different if
she had instead filed a retaliation claim? That depends on the
jurisdiction in which the plaintiff sued for retaliation. 12
Unfortunately, some jurisdictions hold that the act of telling a
supervisor “no” does not create a retaliation claim under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 13 In addition, the Supreme Court of
the United States has not decided whether rejecting sexual
advances constitutes a protected activity for a Title VII retaliation
claim, and the Circuit Courts are split and inconsistent in their
4. Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992).
5. Id. at 180.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. (stating the machine was “torture,” required more manual labor than
her usual machine, and the operator needed to continually babysit the
machine).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 181.
11. The Appellate Court affirmed one summary judgment, but remanded the
other. Id. at 187.
12. Lucille Kauffman did not bring a retaliation claim, but rather two sexual
harassment claims. Id. at 180. However, it would have been possible for her to
bring a retaliation claim based on the facts of the case. Id.
13. See St. Juste v. Metro Plus Health Plan, No. CV-4729, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42653 at *28 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) (stating “courts in the Second
Circuit are split as to weather the rejection of unwanted sexual advances
constitutes a protected activity, and the Second Circuit has not made a
definitive ruling on the issue.”); see also Frank v. Harris County, 118 F. App’x
799, 804 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that one instance of rejecting a supervisor’s
harassment did not constitute a protected activity); see also Farfaras v. Citizens
Bank & Trust of Chicago, No. 01 C 87200, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17612 at *2
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2004) (declining to hold that rejecting sexual advances
qualifies as protected activity for purposes of a retaliation claim).
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rulings, instead choosing to rely on District Court decisions.14 The
Circuit Courts should look to the Sixth and the Eighth Circuit
rulings on the issue. Both Circuits have analyzed the issue
thoroughly and found that refusing sexual advances is a protected
activity, while also addressing and rejecting concerns from other
Circuit and District Court decisions. 15
Part II of this paper outlines Title VII of the Civil Rights of
1964 retaliation claims, types of protected activity, and types of
sexual harassment. Part III will analyze the District Court and
Circuit Court decisions discussing refusing sexual harassment as a
protected activity. Part IV outlines the standards that the Circuit
Courts should follow in determining what is necessary to constitute
a protected activity. Part V examines the policy goals achieved in
setting standards for how rejecting sexual harassment constitutes
a protected activity. Further, Part IV outlines the analysis used by
the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, which should be used going forward.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Discrimination Claims under Title VII
Title VII governs discrimination and retaliation in the work
place, and it makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 16 Sexual harassment is
a form of sex-based discrimination under Title VII. 17 Sexual
harassment is defined as “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature.”18
There are two types of sexual harassment that courts recognize
under Title VII: “hostile work environment” and quid pro quo sexual
harassment.19 A hostile work environment claim is one that entails
“bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.” 20 “Quid
pro quo harassment conditions employment (or promotion) on
sexual favors.”21 In other words, quid pro quo sexual harassment

14. Id.
15. EEOC v New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057 (6th Cir. 2015); Ogden v.
Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2000).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (2012).
17. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2014) (stating that sexual harassment is a
form of discrimination based on sex).
18. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2014).
19. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751–52 (1998).
20. Id.
21. Eugene Scalia, Article, The Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual
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occurs when giving in to an employer’s or coworker’s sexual
demands is “made a condition of employment benefits,” as opposed
to harassment that does not effect an employee’s job standing or
benefits.22 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Guidelines on Sexual Harassment 23 defines conduct as sexual
harassment when:
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly
a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to
or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct
has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.24

While both types of harassment are similar and both actionable
under Title VII,25 the terms “quid pro quo” and “hostile work
environment” are still used to differentiate between cases involving
threats that are carried out (quid pro quo) and cases involving
general offensive conduct (hostile work environment). 26 Thus, the
two types of harassment require different elements to prove a prima
facie case for sexual harassment under Title VII.27
To prove quid pro quo sexual harassment, one must show that:
(1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or
requests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment was based on sex; and
(4) her submission to the unwelcome advances was an express or
implied condition for receiving job benefits or her refusal to submit
resulted in a tangible job detriment.28

Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 307, 308 (1998).
22. Bryson v. Chi. State Univ., 96 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 1996).
23. The EEOC has written guidelines to answer questions that Title VII has
left open. These guidelines the EEOC’s interpretations of Title VII. Margaret H
Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency
Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 388 (2010). While Congress
did not look to the EEOC guidelines and authority in enacting Title VII, courts
have stated that EEOC guidelines may be looked to for guidance, weighing the
validity of the reasoning and the consistency with other pronouncements. Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11.
25. See Henthorn v. Capitol Commc'ns, Inc., 359 F.3d 1021, 1026 (8th Cir.
2004) (stating that both types of claims arise out of the same legal theory under
Title VII).
26. Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1006 (8th Cir. 2000).
27. See Coe v. N. Pipe Prods., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1079 (N.D. Iowa
2008) (listing the elements of both times of harassment as quoted from
Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1006 n.8–9).
28. Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 473 (8th Cir. 1995).
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While hostile work environment claims must prove similar
elements, they differ in two important ways. 29 For a hostile work
environment claim, the plaintiff must show that:
(1)[s]he belongs to a protected group; (2) [s]he was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex;
(4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment and failed to take proper remedial action.30

In contrast to quid pro quo claims, a plaintiff claiming a hostile
work environment only needs to prove that she was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment; she need not show that it was in the
form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors.31 To prove
that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of
employment, the plaintiff must show that it was "sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment."32 The conduct must be
such that not only did the plaintiff subjectively view it as creating
an abusive working environment, but that an objectively reasonable
person would also view it as such.33 Because both sexual
harassment claims and retaliation claims require some showing of
a job detriment,34 they often blend together under Title VII.35

B. Vicarious Liability under Title VII
The Supreme Court held that an employer is subject to
vicarious liability to an employee when a supervisor sexually
harasses that employee, even when the employee takes no tangible
adverse employment action.36 However, in cases where no tangible
employment action was taken, the employer may raise an
affirmative defense.37 This affirmative defense requires two
29. See Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co, 446 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006)
(distinguishing between quid pro quo and hostile work environment claims).
30. Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 864 (8th Cir. 1999).
31. Ogden, 214 F.3d at 1006.
32. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
33. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22.
34. Id. at 1006 n.8–9. While quid pro quo claims require a showing of either
a tangible job detriment or a showing that submitting to sexual demands was a
condition for job benefits, here we focus only on the job detriment, as retaliation
claims also require a job detriment. Id.
35. Allison Westfall, Comment, The Forgotten Provision: How the Courts
Have Misapplied Title VII in Cases of Express Rejection of Sexual Advances, 81
U. CIN. L. REV. 269, 278.
36. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764-5 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
37. Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765.
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elements: “(a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”38 However, no affirmative
defense is available to employers when the supervisor’s harassment
results in a tangible, adverse employment action such as “discharge,
demotion, or undesirable reassignment.” 39

C. Retaliation Claims under Title VII
1. Statutorily Protected Activity
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 governs retaliatory
discharge claims for employees discharged for reporting alleged
discriminatory acts.40 To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff
must allege the following: “(i) that she engaged in a statutorily
protected activity, (ii) she suffered an adverse action at the hands
of the defendant, and (iii) there was a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse action.” 41 A protected activity
includes a plaintiff opposing discriminatory practices or
participating in an “investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under
Title VII.42 Two clauses explain what constitutes protected activity:
the participation clause, and the opposition clause. 43

38. Id.
39. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (stating “it shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice . . . or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
[Title VII].”).
41. Van v. Ford Motor Co. No. 14 cv 8708, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40012, at
*11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2016). Some states add fourth element requiring that the
employer be aware of the defendant’s activity against the plaintiff. GaldieriAmbrosini v. Nat’l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 292 (2d Cir. 1998).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (stating “it shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his
employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice . . . or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under
[Title VII].”)
43. See Offor v. Mercy Med. Ctr., No. 15-cv-2219 (ADS)(SIL), 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31598, at *47 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2016) (stating that protected activity
can be alleged through the “participation clause” or the “opposition clause”).
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a. Participation Clause
The participation clause defines protected activity as one
where a plaintiff has “made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under [Title VII].”44 Courts have consistently held that
participation in an internal investigation, not connected with a
formal EEOC charge, does not qualify as a protected activity under
the participation clause.45 Some courts have gone further and
suggested that protected activity under the participation clause can
only occur within a formal EEOC proceeding.46 However, the
participation clause is not the clause at issue when determining the
effect of rejecting sexual advances and retaliation claims. 47 It is
clear that if one files an EEOC claim based on sexual harassment
and then is retaliated against by an employer, one has a retaliation
claim under Title VII.48
b. Opposition Clause
The opposition clause makes it unlawful for an employer to
retaliate against an employee “because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].”49 Therefore,
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012)
[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice . . . or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].
Id.
45. Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., 679 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2012).
46. See Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000)
(stating that in this case, the participation clause was irrelevant as the plaintiff
had not filed an EEOC charge until after the alleged retaliation occurred).
47.See EEOC v New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1068 (6th Cir. 2015)
(concluding that the opposition clause offers protection for resisting sexual
harassment).
48. See Cristia v. Sys. Eng'g & Sec., Inc., No. 03-2138, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15970, at *29–30 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 2004) (holding that an EEOC charge based
on a reasonable belief of sexual harassment is enough to survive summary
judgment on a claim for retaliatory discharge under Title VII); see also Green v.
Adm'Rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 657 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating
“Title VII does not require that a plaintiff prove that the conduct opposed was
actually in violation of Title VII, but only that a charge was made, or that
participation in an investigation of a violation of Title VII occurred.”).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice . . . or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
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the opposition clause protects informal protests not filed with the
EEOC.50 Further, like the participation clause, the plaintiff does not
need to prove the merit of the underlying discrimination complaint
to establish that the opposition is protected under Title VII. 51
Rather, the plaintiff only needs to establish that he had a
reasonable belief that a violation occurred, and that he acted in good
faith.52 Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
plaintiff does not need to be the one who initiated the
investigation.53 The protected activity of opposing unlawful practice
extends to someone who speaks out during an investigation that the
employee himself did not initiate.54
The Supreme Court has looked at the meaning of “oppose”
under Title VII in Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson
County.55 In that case, the plaintiff was fired after willingly
answering questions during an investigation of a coworker’s claims
of harassment against a supervisor.56 Since “oppose” is not defined
in the statute, the Court held that the word carries its ordinary,
everyday meaning.57 The Court used the dictionary definition of
“oppose,” which is: “[to] resist or antagonize . . . ; to contend
against;58 to confront; resist; withstand.” ‘“When an employee
communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].
Id.
50. Sumner v. United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990)
(“informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making
complaints to management, writing critical letters to customers, protesting
against discrimination by industry or by society in general, and expressing
support of co-workers who have filed formal charges.”).
51. Id.
52. Manoharan v. Columbia University College of Physicians & Surgeons,
842 F.2d 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that a plaintiff must show a "good faith,
reasonable belief that the underlying challenged actions of the employer
violated the law." (citing Abel v. Bonfanti, 625 F. Supp. 263, 267 (S.D.N.Y.
1985)); Francoeur v. Corroon & Black Co., 552 F. Supp. 403, 412 (S.D.N.Y.
1982)).
53. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 555 U.S. 271,
277–78 (2009).
54. Id.
[A] person can "oppose" by responding to someone else's question just as
surely as by provoking the discussion, and nothing in the statute
requires a freakish rule protecting an employee who reports
discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same
discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.
Id.
55. 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
56. Id. at 274.
57. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
58. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1710 (2d ed. 1957)).
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engaged in . . . a form of employment discrimination, that
communication’ virtually always ‘constitutes the employee’
opposition to the activity.”59 While lower courts had previously held
that opposition required active and consistent opposition – perhaps
even the initiation of a complaint – to be covered under the
opposition clause,60 the Supreme Court has taken a broader view in
Crawford. “Countless people were known to "oppose" slavery before
Emancipation . . . without writing public letters, taking to the
streets, or resisting the government.”61 The Court further stated,
“we would call it ‘opposition’ if an employee took a stand against an
employer's discriminatory practices not by ‘instigating’ action, but .
. . by refusing to follow a supervisor's order to fire a junior worker
for discriminatory reasons.”62
In deciding whether certain conduct is a protected activity,
courts attempt to balance Title VII’s goal in protecting employees
taking action through “reasonable opposition activities” (what
courts have held to be protected activities) with the need to allow
employers to select their own employees.63 The scope of what courts
have held constitutes protected activity under the opposition clause
in sexual harassment includes, sending an email complaining of
sexual harassment, answering questions about a co-workers sexual
harassment claim during an investigation, efforts to help a coworker in filing and pursuing a sexual harassment complaint with
the Human Resources Department, and informal complaints to
management.64
59. Id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Crawford v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 555 U.S. 271 (2009) (No. 061595)); citing EEOC Compliance Manual §§ 8-II-B(1), (2), p 614:0003 (Mar.
2003)(emphasis in original).
60. Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 211 F. App'x 373,
376 (6th Cir. 2006).
61. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 277.
62. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (citing McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d
256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) where the court found that an employee was protected
under Title VII when he allowed a subordinate employee to file an EEOC
charge, and his employer retaliated against him)).
63. Matthew W. Green, Express Yourself: Striking a Balance between Silence
and Active, Purposive Opposition Under Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision, 28
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 107, 117 (2010).
64. See Furr v. Ridgewood Surgery & Endoscopy Ctr., LLC, No. 14-1011KHV, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84808, at *42 (D. Kan. June 28, 2016) (holding
that an e-mail to her supervisor and Vice President of the company complaining
of sexual harassment and detailing sexual harassment complaints by other
employees the year before constitute protected activity); see also Crawford, 555
U.S. at 276 (holding that a statement made during a separate investigation
constituted a protected activity when plaintiff stated a fellow employee was
sexually harassing her); see also Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., 617 F.3d
39, 42–4 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that an employee who attempts to assist a coworker in filing a sexual harassment grievance with Human Resources, follows
up with an e-mail to Human Resources and met with Human Resources engages
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Courts generally grant less protection for employee activities
protected by the opposition clause than activities protected by the
participation clause.65 “Activities [protected] under the
participation clause are essential to ‘the machinery set up by Title
VII.’”66 Under the participation clause, an employee is protected
even if the protected activity includes false, defamatory, or
malicious allegations.67 However, under the opposition clause, the
conduct must be such that an objectively reasonable person would
believe the conduct was unlawful.68 The opposition clause allows for
a wider array of conduct to be considered a protected activity (which
only allows retaliation for formal charges), it allows for more claims
to move forward that would be unable to be brought under only the
participation clause.69
2. Adverse Action
A plaintiff must also show that she has suffered an adverse
employment action.70 Under Title VII, and adverse employment
action must be either an ultimate employment decision, or it must
in protected activity under the opposition clause); see also Speed v. WES Health
Sys., 93 F. Supp. 3d 351, 356 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (stating “[i]nformal complaints to
management have specifically been found to fall within the scope of protection
afforded by Title VII’s opposition clause.”).
65. Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1312 (6th
Cir. 1989).
66. Laughlin v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 149 F.3d 253,
259 n.4 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 689 (9th
Cir. 1997).
67. See Daravin v. Kerik, 355 F.3d 195, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining
that a plaintiff is protected under the participation clause even if the charge
includes facts that are incorrect, defamatory, or malicious); see also Sias v. City
Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th. Cir. 1978) (stating that a
plaintiff is protected under the participation clause even if the charge “lacks
merit.”).
68. See Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57
(2006) (holding that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII protects “those
(and only those) employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a
reasonable employee or job applicant.”); see also Higgins v. New Balance
Athletic Shoe, Inc., 195 F.3d 252, 261–62 (1st. Cir. 1999) (stating that Title VII
requires that the employee believed the activity was unlawful).
69. Matthew W. Green, Express Yourself: Striking a Balance between Silence
and Active, Purposive Opposition Under Title VII’s Antiretaliation Provision, 28
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 107, 117 (2010).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012)
[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice . . . or because he
has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].
Id.
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“meet some threshold level of substantiality.” 71 An ultimate
employment decision is one that results in the employees
termination, the employee’s demotion, or a failure to hire. 72 Not
every decision by an employer that results in negative consequences
for an employee will rise to the level of an adverse action under Title
VII.73 Courts have held that subjective injuries such as humiliation,
adverse reassignment, or loss of reputation within the work place
do not rise to the level of adverse actions. 74 Further, the Supreme
Court held that “trivial harms,” “petty slights,” and “minor
annoyances” differ from the “materially adverse” actions required
under Title VII.75
In cases involving Title VII, the plaintiff has the initial burden
of proof to show discrimination and adverse employment action in a
retaliation case.76 If the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden
shifts to the defendant.77 The defendant then must show legitimate
reasons for an adverse employment action.78 Once the defendant
has shown legitimate reasons for the adverse employment action,
the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that these
reasons are pre-textual.79
Finally, once a defendant offers a nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse action, the court must analyze whether the employer’s
reasoning for the adverse action is actually non-discriminatory in
nature, or whether it is pre-textual.80
3.

Causal Link

The conduct that an employee is opposing must be made
unlawful by Title VII. 81 At a minimum, the plaintiff needs a
reasonable belief that the conduct was unlawful under Title VII. 82
There also must be a causal link between the protected activity and
71. Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 617 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Bass v. Bd. Of County Comm’rs, Orange County, Fla., 256 F.3d 1095, 1118 (11th
Cir. 2001)).
72. Id.
73. Ware v. Billington, 344 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2004).
74. Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1130–31 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
75. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)
76. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
77. See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir.
2001) (holding that a plaintiff had the burden of proof in showing that the
defendant’s proffered reasons for terminating the plaintiff were, in fact,
pretextual).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Morales v. Gotbaum, 42 F. Supp. 3d 175, 187–88 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Brady
v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493–94 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
82. Dea v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 11 Fed. Appx. 352, 357–58
(4th Cir. 2001).
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the adverse employment action.83 In order to show this causal link,
the plaintiff must show that the adverse action would not have
occurred “but for” the plaintiff’s protected activity. 84 Title VII’s
causation standard states that “an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.”85 This is a lesser causation standard than the “but for”
standard that courts have used.86 However, the Supreme Court has
held that it is not enough that the protected activity be a
“motivating factor” in the adverse employment action; it must, in
fact be, the “but-for” causation.87 The Court looked to “[t]he text,
structure, and history of Title VII” and held that a plaintiff making
a retaliation claim under Title VII must establish that “his or her
protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action
by the employer.”88
When looking at whether refusing sexual advances constitutes
a protected activity, the opposition clause is used to determine
whether the refusal is a protected activity under Title VII. 89 The
EEOC holds sexual harassment as a type of discrimination based
on sex.90 Because sexual harassment is an unlawful activity under
Title VII,91 courts have held that opposing sexual harassment
constitutes protected activity.92 The EEOC guidelines both define
sexual harassment and label it as a type of discrimination based on
sex.93 While the EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment are not
83. Beall v Abbott Labs., 130 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir. 1997).
84. Klein v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 766 F.2d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 1985)
85. 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2(m).
86. Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2526
(2013).
87. Id. at 2534.
88. Id.
89. See Mealus v Nirvana Spring Water N.Y. Inc., No. 7:13-cv00313(MAD/DEP), 2014 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 128968, at *37–38 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. Sep.
16, 2014) (stating that courts have found refusing to submit to sexual advances
is a “protected activity” because it is opposing sexual harassment, an unlawful
practice under Title VII).
90. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (stating that it is unlawful to harass someone
based on his/her sex).
91. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (analyzing
the language of Title VII and stating that “when a supervisor sexually harasses
a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor "discriminate[s]"
on the basis of sex.”).
92. See Livingston v. Marion Bank & Trust Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1316
(N.D. Ala. 2014) (holding a complaint to a supervisor regarding sexually
harassing conduct is protected when the employee reasonably believes the
harassment is unlawful under Title VII).
93. The EEOC has written guidelines to answer questions that Title VII has
left open. These guidelines the EEOC’s interpretations of Title VII. Margaret H
Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency
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controlling on the courts, they do “constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance.”94

III. ANALYSIS
Circuit courts are split on the issue of whether rejecting a
supervisor’s sexual harassment reaches the level necessary to
create a protected activity under the opposition clause. 95 Leading to
further confusion, district courts have inconsistent rulings with
different reasons for their holdings.96
The Second Circuit has declined to rule on the issue, and the
district courts are split on their holdings. 97 The Fifth Circuit has
repeatedly held that refusing sexual advances is not enough on its
own to create a protected activity under Title VII. 98 The Sixth
Circuit has held that rejecting a supervisor’s sexual advances
creates a protected activity under Title VII. 99 The Seventh Circuit
has also declined to rule on the issue, and the district courts are
split in their holdings.100 However, the majority of district courts in
the Seventh Circuit have either rejected the argument that refusing
sexual advances is a protected activity, or they have also declined
to rule on the issue.101 The Eighth Circuit has also held that

Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 388 (2010). While Congress
did not look to the EEOC guidelines and authority in enacting Title VII, courts
have stated that EEOC guidelines may be looked to for guidance, weighing the
validity of the reasoning and the consistency with other pronouncements. Gen.
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
94. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 142 (1976) (applying this analysis of the role of
interpretive rulings to the EEOC guidelines) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
95. Diana M Watral, When "No" Is Not Enough: The Express Rejection of
Sexual Advances under Title VII, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 521, 527 (2010).
96. Id. at 528 (stating “[d]espite the relative evenness of the split, few courts
have provided the same justifications for their decisions.”).
97. Mealus v Nirvana Spring Water N.Y. Inc., No. 7:13-cv00313(MAD/DEP), 2014 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 128968, at *37–38 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. Sep.
16, 2014)
98. LeMaire v. Louisiana, 480 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2007).
99. EEOC v New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1067-68 (6th Cir. 2015).
100. EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 844, 875 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(stating “[t]he Seventh Circuit has expressly declined to address the issue.”); see
also Tate v. Exec. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (deciding
the issue based on other ground and choosing not to discuss the issue); see also
Murray v. Chi. Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 880, 890 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating “we
need not decide whether a plaintiff who rejects a sexual invitation from a
supervisor has met the first element of a claim for retaliation.”).
101. Caterpillar, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d at 875 n.8; see also Farfaras v.
Citizens Band & trust of Chicago, No. 01 C 8720, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17612,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2004) (declining to hold that rejecting sexual advances
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rejecting sexual advances is enough to constitute a protected
activity under Title VII. 102 The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have
yet to rule on the issue. 103 The District Courts in the Ninth Circuit
have held that refusing sexual advances is not, on its own, a
protected activity, but the District Courts in the Eleventh Circuit
have held the opposite, finding that it is enough.104 Finally, the D.C.
District Court has repeatedly found that such conduct is a protected
activity under Title VII, and cites to Eighth Circuit cases in its
reasoning.105

A. The Second Circuit and its District Courts
The Second Circuit has declined to rule on this issue. 106 In
Fitzgerald v. Henderson, the Second Circuit specifically chose not to
address whether resisting sexual advances was enough to state a
retaliation claim.107 As recently as 2014, the Second Circuit has
continued to decline considering this issue. 108
The district courts do not offer clear guidance within the
Second District, either, as they are split on this issue.109 Some courts
have found that rejecting sexual advances constitutes a protected
is enough to create a protected activity to form a retaliation claim under Title
VII).
102. See Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000)
(finding that a plaintiff engaged in the most “basic form of protected conduct”
when she told her supervisor to stop harassing her.).
103. Alhozbur v. McHugh, No. C 09-01576 EJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79407, at *22 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2011).
104. Id. at *24 (quoting Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, 941 F. Supp. 437,
439 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)); Ross, No. 06-0275-WS-B, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23715, at
*20–21 (stating “[t]he reasoning of the Ogden line of authority is sound.”).
105. See LeMaire v. Louisiana, 480 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2007). (holding
that a “single, express rejection” of sexual advances does not constitute
“protected activity” for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim); Contrast with
EEOC v New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1067-68 (6th Cir. 2015),783 F.3d 1957
(stating that if an employee resists a supervisor’s sexual harassment, then the
opposition clause provides protection for that behavior) and Ogden, 214 F.3d at
1007 (finding that a plaintiff engaged in protected conduct when telling a
supervisor to stop harassing her).
106. Mealus v Nirvana Spring Water N.Y. Inc., No. 7:13-cv00313(MAD/DEP), 2014 U.S. Dis. LEXIS 128968, at *37–38 n.5 (N.D.N.Y. Sep.
16, 2014)
107. See Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 366 (2d Cir. 2001) (declining
to reach the issue of whether “a valid retaliation claim must allege that the
employee suffered adverse employment consequences because she lodged or
threatened to lodge a complaint about her supervisor, and is insufficient if it
alleges "only" that she suffered such consequences because she resisted her
supervisor's sexual advances.”).
108. See Pedrosa v. City of N.Y., No. 13 Civ. 01890, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3315, at *26 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2014) (stating that “[t]he Second Circuit has
yet to settle this question.”).
109. Watral, supra note 95, at 528.
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activity under the opposition clause of Title VII.110 These courts hold
that because sexual harassment is an unlawful activity under Title
VII, an employee who rejects such activity is opposing it and has
protection under Title VII.111 In Laurin v. Pokoik, the plaintiff
alleged that her continuous rejection of her supervisor’s sexual
harassment resulted in her termination. 112 The court held that
because the defendant had no formal policies regarding sexual
harassment and no formal avenue of making complaints, the
plaintiff’s only option to oppose the harassment was by rejecting the
advances.113 Therefore, in this instance, with no other options in
place, rebuffing sexual advances constituted a protected activity. 114
On the other side, some district courts in the Second Circuit
have held that “even the broadest interpretation of a retaliation
claim cannot encompass instances where the alleged ‘protected
activity’ consists simply of declining a harasser's sexual
advances.”115 These courts also focus on the idea that if refusing
sexual advances were enough to constitute a protected activity for a
retaliation claim, then every harassment claim would automatically
state a retaliation claim as well.116 For example, in Rashid v. Beth
Isr. Med. Ctr., the plaintiff was terminated only three days after the
alleged sexual assault, and the court concluded that this better fit a
quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, and a retaliation claim was
“duplicative and unnecessary.”117

110. Id.
111. See Laurin v. Pokoik, No. 02-CV-1938, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6728, *4
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2005) (holding that indirectly complaining to a supervisor by
“rebuffing” his sexual advances constitutes a protected activity); Little v. NBC,
210 F. Supp. 2d. 330, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that rejecting the sexual
advances from an employer constitutes a protected activity); Lange v. Town of
Monroe, 213 F. Supp. 2d 411, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (declaring that “resisting
sexual harassment is a means of opposing unlawful conduct . . . and hold that
plaintiff engaged in a protected activity when she rebuffed Montanye's
advances.”).
112. Laurin, No. 02-CV-1938, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6728, at *5.
113. Id. at *12.
114. Id.
115. Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, 941 F. Supp. 437, 438–39 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
116. Id.; See also Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 355 (2d Cir. 2001)
(reasoning that "rejection of sexual advances is not a protected activity.”);
Rashid v. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr., No. 96 Civ. 1833 (AGS),1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15602, *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1998) (stating that a retaliation claim and a quid
pro quo harassment claim are duplicative, and refusing sexual advances is not
enough to create a protected activity).
117. Rashid v. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr., No. 96 Civ. 1833 (AGS),1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15602, *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1998)
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B. The Fifth Circuit and its District Courts
The Fifth Circuit first looked at this issue in Frank v. Harris
County and found that the plaintiff “provide[d] no authority for the
proposition that a single ‘express rejection’ to [a harassing
supervisor] constitutes as a matter of law a protected activity.”118
However, in the Frank decision, the court did not explain why an
informal complaint to a harassing supervisor was not enough to
constitute a protected activity, nor did it look to the opposition
clause of Title VII in its analysis.119
In 2007, the Fifth Circuit once again stated that the plaintiff
had not offered any authority to support his claim that rejecting a
supervisor’s sexual harassment was a protected activity. 120 In
LeMaire v. Louisiana, the plaintiff objected to his supervisor’s
sexually explicit stories and comments, and he claimed he received
assignments outside of his job description as a result. 121 When he
refused to perform these assignments outside of his job description,
he was suspended and ultimately fired.122
The court provided no reasoning for its decision that objecting
to sexual advances was not a protected activity, and instead relied
on the Franks decision in stating that the plaintiff had not shown
any positive authority for his claim that this was a protected activity
under Title VII.123

C. Sixth Circuit and its District Courts
The Sixth Circuit first ruled on this issue in EEOC v. New
Breed Logistics in 2015. Prior to that ruling, the district courts in
the Sixth Circuit had held that “telling a harasser, who also was
serving as her supervisor, to cease all forms of physical and verbal
harassment” was “engag[ing] in the most basic form of protected
conduct.”124 The district courts in the Sixth Circuit have
consistently held that complaints to a harassing supervisor
constitute a protected activity under Title VII.125
118. Frank v. Harris County, 118 F. App'x 799, 804 (5th Cir. 2004).
119. EEOC v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1068 (6th Cir. 2015).
120. LeMaire v. Louisiana, 480 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2007).
121. Id. at 390.
122. Id.
123. Watral, supra note 95, at 531.
124. Quarles v. McDuffie Cty., 949 F. Supp. 846, 853 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
125. See Reed v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d
1055, 1070 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (holding an employee had engaged in protected
conduct when she told her immediate supervisor directly to stop sexually
harassing her and relying on the reasoning laid out in Quarles,949 F. Supp.
at853.See also Berthiaume v. Appalachian Christian Vill. Found., Inc., No. 2:07CV-46, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78724, at *11 (E.D. Tenn. Sep. 4, 2008) (following
the holdings in Quarles and Reed).
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In EEOC v. New Breed Logistics, the Sixth Circuit concluded
that it would follow the holdings and opinions of the district
courts.126 The plaintiffs alleged that their supervisor repeatedly and
daily made sexually explicit comments to them, as well as physically
sexually harassed them.127 The plaintiffs repeatedly told the
supervisor to leave them alone.128 In response to the plaintiff’s
rebuffing of the supervisor’s advances, the plaintiffs were
transferred and eventually terminated.129 The Sixth Circuit held
that “a complaint to a harassing supervisor qualifies as protected
activity[,]” focusing its reasoning on the language of the opposition
clause in Title VII.130
In examining the opposition clause, the Sixth Circuit stated
that sexual harassment is an unlawful practice under Title VII, and
therefore “[i]f an employee demands that his/her supervisor stop
engaging in this unlawful practice . . . the opposition clause’s broad
language confers protection to this conduct.” 131 The court in EEOC
v. New Breed also focused on the fact that the opposition clause does
not require the plaintiff complain or direct the protected activity at
a specific person designated by the company, but rather can
complain to anyone in a supervisory position. 132 Therefore, even
complaints to the harassing supervisor constitute protected activity
under the opposition clause.133
The Sixth Circuit went one step further in this opinion and
addressed the argument that all harassment claims will turn into
retaliation claims if rejecting sexual advances is a protected
activity.134 The court, in addressing this concern, explained that a
harassment claim cannot turn into a retaliation claim unless the
harasser initiates an adverse employment action against the victim
in response to opposing the harassment.135 “Thus, giving retaliation
victims protection where they complain to the harasser will not
morph all harassment claims into a retaliation claim, absent some
materially adverse action.”136

126. EEOC v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1067 (6th Cir. 2015).
127. Id. at 1062–63.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1067.
131. Id. at 1067–68.
132. Id.; see also Warren v. Ohio Dep't of Pub. Safety, 24 F. App'x 259, 265
(6th Cir. 2001) (holding “[t]here is no qualification on who the individual doing
the complaining may be or on who the party to whom the complaint is made.”).
133.EEOC v New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1062-63 (6th Cir. 2015).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1068.
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D. Seventh Circuit and its District Courts
The Seventh Circuit has expressly chosen not to address
whether rebuffing sexual advances is a protected activity. 137 The
district courts in the Seventh Circuit are split on the issue, with the
majority either holding that refusing sexual advances is not a
protected activity, or declining to hold that refusing sexual advances
is a protected activity.138 One court reasoned that the purpose of the
anti-retaliation provision in Title VII “is to prevent employee
grievances and Title VII claims from being deterred,” not to protect
an employee who rejects a supervisor’s sexual advances. 139 In
Bowers v. Radiological Soc’y of North America, Inc., the court held
that rejection was not enough.140 Rather, a retaliation claim
requires submitting a complaint to management or filing a charge
against the harasser.141 Because the Seventh Circuit has expressly
declined to rule on this issue, the court has chosen to side with the
majority opinion of its district courts in “declining to hold that
rejecting sexual advances qualifies as protected activity for
purposes of making a retaliation claim.” 142
However, two judges in the district courts have ventured to
state that refusal of sexual advances may constitute a protected
activity under certain circumstances. 143 In one such case, the court
held that refusing sexual advances only constituted protected
activity because under the circumstances, it was one of the only
options the plaintiff had at his disposal to oppose sexual

137. EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d 844, 875 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(stating “[t]he Seventh Circuit has expressly declined to address the issue.”); see
also Tate v. Exec. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 546 F.3d 528, 532 (7th Cir. 2008) (deciding
the issue based on other ground and choosing not to discuss the issue); see also
Murray v. Chi. Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 880, 890 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating “we
need not decide whether a plaintiff who rejects a sexual invitation from a
supervisor has met the first element of a claim for retaliation.”).
138. Caterpillar, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d at 875 n.8; see also Farfaras v.
Citizens Bank & Trust of Chicago, No. 01 C 8720, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17612,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2004) (declining to hold that rejecting sexual advances
is enough to create a protected activity to form a retaliation claim under Title
VII).
139. Jones v. Cty. of Cook, No. 01 C 9876, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13075, at
*11 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2002).
140. Bowers v. Radiological Soc'y of North America, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 594,
599 (N.D. Ill.1999).
141. Id.
142. Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of Chicago, No. 01 C 87200, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17612 at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2004) ); See also Speer v. Rand
McNally & Co., No. 95 C 6269, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17071, at *24 n.4 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 14, 1996) (holding that refusal of sexual advances is “not the type of
"protected activity" which is properly the source of a Title VII, retaliation
claim.”).
143. Caterpillar, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 2d at 875 n.8.
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harassment.144 The court focused on the fact that the plaintiff had
no knowledge of the sexual harassment policy, that he was alleging
that his direct supervisor was the harasser, and that he was
instructed not to complain or it would backfire on him.145 In Roberts
v. County of Cook, Judge Kennelly analyzed the opposition clause of
Title VII and stated that “[o]pposing sexually harassing behavior
constitutes ‘opposing any practice made an unlawful employment
practice’ by Title VII, and accordingly it is activity protected by §
2000e-3(a).”146
In two more recent district court decisions, the decision not to
rule on the issue has caused an unforeseen circle to emerge.
Currently, the district courts are relying on a footnote in EEOC v.
Caterpillar, Inc. stating that the majority of the district courts do
not allow retaliation claims for refusing sexual advances, because it
is not a protected activity.147 This has allowed the Seventh Circuit
144. See Estes v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., No. 05 C 5750, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11666, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 2007) (reasoning that the employee had
no option to report the harassment, and therefore refusing his supervisor’s
advances was a protected activity under Title VII). In this case, the plaintiff was
hired as a special assistant to a Tanya Wertz. Id. at *1. Wertz was both his
supervisor and the second highest rank in her department. Id. Plaintiff was
never given a copy of the company’s sexual harassment policy. Id. at *7–8. Wertz
harassed the plaintiff, telling him she wanted a romantic relationship with him
and referring to him as her “boy toy.” Id. at *2. On a business trip, she demanded
he have sex with her or lose his job, which he refused. Id. at *2–3. He then
requested a meeting with Wertz’s supervisor, but he was told if he did it would
backfire on him. Id. at *7–8. He was fired shortly thereafter. Id.
145. Estes, No. 05 C 5750, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11666, at *10–11. The court
then cites to Laurin v. Pokoik, No. 02-CV-1938, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6728, *4
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2005).
Viewed favorably to him, the record shows that DHS made no effort to
apprise plaintiff of its sexual harassment policy; the alleged harasser is
plaintiff's immediate supervisor, second-in-command at DHS and a
decades-long friend of the head of DHS; and, when plaintiff complained
to Adams' assistant about the harassment, he was told not to tell Adams
because any report to her would backfire on plaintiff.
Id. Its holding that rejection of sexual advances constitutes protected activity
when there is not sexual harassment policy, and the only people to whom the
plaintiff could have complained were her alleged harasser’s business partner
and finds the situations comparable. Id.
146. Roberts v. Cty. of Cook, No. 01 C 9373, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8089, at
*14 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-3(a)); see also Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (stating that sexual harassment
violates Title VII when it is “so ‘severe and pervasive’ as to ‘alter the conditions
of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”)
(quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
147. Van v. Ford Motors Co., No. 14 cv 8708, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40012,
at *12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2016) (citing EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., 628 F. Supp.
2d 844, 875 n.8 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (stating that “most courts in this district have
held that Title VII does not recognize refusal of an employer’s sexual advances
as protected activity” and recognizing that the Seventh Circuit has declined to
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to follow the decisions of district courts rather than rule on the issue
themselves.148 This leads to both the district courts and the Seventh
Circuit relying on old district court rulings rather than analyzing
the issue themselves. For example, in Van v. Ford Motor Co., the
Northern District of Illinois held that, absent a ruling from the
Seventh Circuit on the issue, the court would not find that refusing
sexual advances is enough to constitute a protected activity. 149
Further, in Doe v. TRP Acquisition, Inc., the Northern District once
again emphasized that without a ruling from the Seventh Circuit,
it would follow the majority of district court decisions in finding that
retaliation claims fail when refusal of sexual advances is the only
protected activity alleged.150

E. Eighth Circuit and its District Courts
The Eighth Circuit held that rejecting a supervisor’s sexual
advances was a protected activity under Title VII in Ogden v. Wax
Works.151 In Ogden, the plaintiff, Kerry Ogden, worked as a sales
manager at Wax Works.152 She alleges that her district manager
sexually harassed her for over a year.153 She claims that the district
manager grabbed her twice while he was intoxicated, once asking
her to come back to his motel room with him.154 Each time she
pushed him away and told him not to touch her and to leave her
alone.155 One of the times in which she refused him, he responded
with a physical threat.156 The district manager also offered to stay
at her home to “protect” her, regularly asked her to go for drinks,
and asked her to stay with him at his home.157 Ogden repeatedly

address the issue).
148. Roberts, No. 01 C 9373, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8089, at *14 (quoting 42
U.S.C.§ 2000e-3(a)); see also Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786 (stating that sexual
harassment violates Title VII when it is “so ‘severe and pervasive’ as to ‘alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment.’”) (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
149. Van, No. 14 cv 8708, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40012, at *12–13 (stating
“[u]ntil such time that the Seventh Circuit resolves the issue in this circuit, or
the Supreme Court resolves the circuit-split, this Court finds that plaintiffs
cannot state a claim for retaliation where the sole protected activity alleged is
the refusing of sexual advances.”).
150. Doe v. TRP Acquisition, Inc., No. 16 C 3635, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
89259, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 11, 2016).
151. See Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000)
(finding that a plaintiff engaged in the most “basic form of protected conduct”
when she told her supervisor to stop harassing her.).
152. Id. at 1003.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1003.
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refused the requests and advances, and the district manager began
routinely criticizing her performance and “screamed” at her over
work matters.158 Ultimately, the district manager refused to give
Ogden her yearly evaluation (which controlled her raise) unless she
accompanied him on a “three-day gambling spree,” and when she
declined, he denied her vacation request and refused to conduct her
evaluation.159
Ogden also alleged that she had informed her regional
manager of the harassment, and he acknowledged that the district
manager received warnings previously about his interactions with
other employees.160 The regional manager requested to meet with
her, but Ogden was ill and unable to meet during his visit, and the
regional manager insisted that she missed her chance by not coming
to the meeting to address her complaints.161 She attempted to call
the home office twice to complain to the vice president, but her calls
went unreturned.162
While the Ogden court, did not go into great detail in discussing
the retaliation claim, the court stated that Ogden engaged in “the
most basic form of protected activity” when she asked her
immediate supervisor to “stop his offensive conduct.” 163 The court
looked to the opposition clause of Title VII in holding that the jury
reasonably concluded that Ogden was opposing discriminatory
conduct when she asked her supervisor to stop harassing her. 164
The Eighth Circuit has not re-visited this question since
Ogden, but recent district court cases have interpreted Ogden’s
ruling broadly, holding that rejecting a supervisor’s sexual
advances constitutes a protected activity even when her sexual
harassment claim and sexual discrimination claim both failed. 165
Other Eighth Circuit district courts have cited Ogden and held that
“telling a supervisor to stop offensive conduct is protected.” 166
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1003-04.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1005.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1007.
164. Id.
165. Christensen v. Cargill, Inc., No. C14-4121-MWB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
132475, at *30–32 (N.D. Iowa Sep. 30, 2015). The court in Christensen made
this argument even though the defendants claimed that the only protected
activity alleged in the complaint was a discussion with management about the
harassment. Id. The court stated that although the defendants failed to note
that the rejection of sexual propositions was a protected activity, it found that
this was enough to state a retaliation claim under Title VII. Id.
166. Wendt v. Charter Communs., LLC, No. 13-1308 (RHK/TNL), 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 176500, at *13 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2014); see also Ramirez v. City of
Fredericktown, No. 1:13-cv-2 SNLJ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67603, at *16 (E.D.
Mo. May 13, 2013) (reasoning that although telling a supervisor to stop
harassing behavior is protected under Ogden’s reasoning, the harassing
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F. Ninth Circuit and its District Courts
The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed this issue, and only
one district court has addressed it, holding that “rejecting a sexual
advance does not amount to protected activity.” 167 In doing so, it
adopted the rationale of Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, Inc. in
finding that if rejecting sexual advances is a protected activity, then
“every harassment claim would automatically state a retaliation
claim as well."168 Further, the court reasoned that rejecting sexual
advances fails to meet the criteria for a protected activity because
refusal directed towards a harasser, even when the harasser is a
supervisor, does not constitute notice to the employer, a
requirement that the Ninth Circuit adds to its elements for a
retaliation claim.169

G. Eleventh Circuit and its District Courts
The Eleventh Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, but its
district courts have held that refusing a direct supervisor’s sexual
advances constitutes a protected activity. 170 In Livingston v. Marion
Bank & Tr. Co., the court reasoned that in situations where a
plaintiff demands that supervisor stops harassing her, the
supervisor would “necessarily be aware of all preceding instances of
his own sexually harassing conduct,” thereby rejecting claims that
refusing a supervisor’s harassment cannot be considered notice to
the employer.171 The court in Ross v. Baldwin Cty. Bd. Of Educ.
behavior must be objectively offensive to trigger Title VII and not simply
“inappropriate.”).
167. Alhozbur v. McHugh, No. C 09-01576 EJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
79407, at *22 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2011).
168. Id. at *24 (quoting Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, 941 F. Supp. 437,
439 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
169. Id. (holding that “refusal directed to the alleged harasser, even where
the harasser is a supervisor, cannot be equated with notice to the employer.”).
170. See Livingston v. Marion Bank & Tr. Co., 30 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1316
(N.D. Ala. 2014) (holding that “a complaint made to the harassing supervisor,
accompanied by a demand that he cease engaging in sexually harassing conduct
generally, may be protected where the employee could reasonably believe that
the supervisor's harassment, viewed cumulatively, was unlawful under Title
VII.”); see also Ross v. Baldwin Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 06-0275-WS-B, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23715, at *20-21 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 24, 2008) (holding that a plaintiff
demanding that her supervisor stop groping her while at work “unquestionably”
was a protected activity under Title VII).
171. Livingston, 30 F. Supp. 3d at 1316 (citing EEOC v. Go Daddy Software,
Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 2009).
[I]f a person has been subjected to more than one comment, and if those
comments, taken together, would be considered by a reasonable person
to violate Title VII, that person need not complain specifically about all
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looked to the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Ogden for its ruling.172
The court further went on to state that to hold that retaliation
claims may only proceed when complaints are made to an official
designated by the employer would undermine the purpose of Title
VII’s protections.173 Moreover, this narrow reading of Title VII
would frustrate its remedial purpose and “transform the protection
against retaliation into a mirage.”174

H. The D.C. District Court
The D.C. District Court has repeatedly held that rejecting
sexual advances constitutes a protected activity under Title VII. 175
The court does not give a reasoning for its holdings, but rather cites
cases from other districts and circuit courts, like Ogden.176

IV. PROPOSAL
With only three circuits ruling on the issue, there is no clear
majority as to how the circuits are addressing this issue.177 Further
causing confusion, in the circuits refusing to address the issue, the
district courts are split. However, the rulings in the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits provide a detailed analysis of Title VII’s opposition
clause, giving a well-rounded legal basis for finding that refusing

of the comments to which he or she has been subjected . . . a complaint
about one or more of these comments is protected behavior.
Id.
172. Ross, No. 06-0275-WS-B, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23715, at *20–21
(stating “[t]he reasoning of the Ogden line of authority is sound.”).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Dozier-Nix v. District of Columbia, 851 F. Supp. 2d 163, 168 (D.D.C.
2012) (stating “[s]tatutorily protected activities include rebuffing unwanted
sexual advances.”); see also Miller v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42385 *, 89 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P42,860 (D.D.C. June 11,
2007) (holding that a plaintiff participated in a protected activity when rejected
sexual advances); see also McCain v. CCA of Tenn., Inc., 254 F. Supp. 2d 115,
124 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that there is “no question” that rejecting sexual
advances is a statutorily protected activity).
176. See Dozier-Nix, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (D.D.C. 2012) (compiling cases).
177. See LeMaire v. Louisiana, 480 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding
that a “single, express rejection” of sexual advances does not constitute
“protected activity” for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim); Contrast with
EEOC v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1067-68 (6th Cir. 2015) (stating
that if an employee resists a supervisor’s sexual harassment, then the
opposition clause provides protection for that behavior) and Ogden v. Wax
Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that a plaintiff engaged
in protected conduct when telling a supervisor to stop harassing her).
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sexual advances is a protected activity, and other districts should
use this analysis in their rulings. 178
The district courts give varying reasons for their decisions, not
all of which are wholly consistent with the language of Title VII. For
instance, the district courts in Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores and
Rashid v. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr. stated that every harassment claim
would also be a retaliation claim if refusing sexual advances was a
protected activity.179 However, the Sixth Circuit correctly addressed
this in EEOC v. New Breed Logistics and looked to the language in
Title VII, finding that sexual harassment claims cannot turn into
retaliation claims without an adverse employment action, thereby
silencing the arguments from the Second Circuit’s district courts.180
The Sixth Circuit’s argument is compelling. Sexual
harassment claims provide relief for a plaintiff even when no
adverse employment action is taken against the employee. It is not
logical to conclude that sexual harassment claims will
automatically become retaliation claims if refusing sexual advances
is considered a protected activity. Retaliation claims require an
adverse employment action.181 Further, it is difficult to argue the
distinction between a complaint to a harassing supervisor and a
complaint to a neutral supervisor about a coworker’s harassment.
When an employee’s supervisor is the one doing the harassing, to
whom can an employee voice her complaint? The Northern District
of Illinois found that under very specific circumstances, a plaintiff’s
complaint to a harassing supervisor would be enough to constitute
a protected activity.182 However, those facts are limited to cases
where the harasser is an immediate supervisor, second-in-command
at the company, old friends with the head of the company, and the
harasser did not inform the plaintiff of the sexual harassment policy

178. See id. (discussing the opposition clause under Title VII and finding
that and employee instructing a supervisor to stop harassing her constitutes
protected conduct under Title VII); see also New Breed Logistics,783 F.3d at
1067-68 (finding that refusing sexual advances constitutes a protected activity
under the opposition clause because the employee is opposing sexual
harassment, an unlawful activity).
179. Del Castillo v. Pathmark Stores, 941 F. Supp. 437, 438-39 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Alhozbur v. McHugh, No. C 09-01576 EJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79407,
at *22 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2011).
180. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d at 1068 (stating, “[a]ssuming the other
elements of a prima facie case are present, a harassment claim only becomes a
retaliation claim if, after the harassed opposes the harassment, the harasser
initiates adverse action against the victim. Thus, giving retaliation victims
protection where they complain to the harasser will not morph all harassment
claims into a retaliation claim, absent some materially adverse action.”).
181. Van v. Ford Motor Co. No. 14 cv 8708, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40012, at
*11 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2016) (stating the requirements for a retaliation claim,
including that there be an adverse employment action against the employee).
182. Roberts v. Cty. of Cook, No. 01 C 9373, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8089, at
*5 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2004).
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and warned her not to complain to management. 183 These facts
should not be necessary; if the alleged harasser is a direct
supervisor, requiring a plaintiff to circumvent the supervisor and
complain to management that she may not have access to
communication with puts an unreasonable burden on the plaintiff.
Moreover, imagine a scenario where an employee rejects a
supervisor’s sexual advances once. In order to keep her job, the
employee may not report this single incident in hopes that the
rejection is enough to stop the harasser from continuing. However,
imagine that the harasser continues, but fires the employee
immediately after she rejects his advances a second time. The
employee has not had the opportunity to complain to someone
outside of the supervisor, let alone file a complaint with the EEOC.
Under the logic of the rulings in cases such as Bowers v.
Radiological Soc’y of North America, Inc., the employee will not
have a retaliation claim under Title VII without a complaint to
management or filing a claim with the EEOC, and there is no cause
of action for the employee in this scenario. 184 This kind of logic could
potentially incentivize harassers to simply fire employees before
they have the chance to file a complaint.
With no guidance from the circuit courts and inconsistent
rulings from district courts, it is also nearly impossible for
employers and employees to know how to proceed in such retaliation
claims. For this reason, the Circuit Courts need to address this issue
and give the district courts a standard to follow so that rulings
remain consistent. Further, the Circuit Courts should follow the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits in their holdings that rejecting sexual
advances is protected activity for retaliation claims under Title
VII.185
In 2000, the Eighth Circuit held that Ogden engaged in “the
most basic form of protected activity” in telling her supervisor to
stop harassing her.186 However, the court only spent a few sentences
of the opinion discussing this holding. The court simply stated that
refusing sexual advances was opposing discriminatory conduct
under Title VII, therefore constituting a protected activity. 187 This
reasoning is based solely on the language of Title VII, looking at the
opposition clause, and does not stipulate that certain facts be
present. This is the approach that should be taken by other Circuit

183. Id.
184. Bowers v. Radiological Soc'y of North America, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 594,
599 (N.D. Ill.1999) (holding that an employee cannot state a claim for retaliation
simply based on rejection of a sexual relationship, but rather must submit a
complaint to management or file a charge).
185. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d at 1068; TRP Acquisition,Inc., No. 16 C
3635, at *5.
186. Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000).
187. Id.
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Courts. The basic statutory language of the opposition clause states
that it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee for opposing
discriminatory conduct.188 Because sexual harassment is unlawful
under Title VII,189 rejecting a harassing supervisor’s advances falls
into opposing discriminatory conduct under the opposition clause.
While there is an argument that an employee must explain
that she is objecting to unlawful behavior because she reasonably
believes that the conduct violates Title VII, 190 this argument is
flawed and based on district court cases holding that an employee
“has to at least say something to indicate her gender is an issue.” 191
While this statement may be true in gender discrimination cases
not involving sexual harassment, refusing sexual advances of a
harassing supervisor logically is opposing discrimination based on
gender under Title VII.192 There is no logic in requiring a victim to
go one step farther and tell the supervisor she is rejecting his
advances because it is unlawful. Sexual harassment is a genderbased discrimination by its very nature, and commonly known to be
unlawful. Moreover, supervisors will likely have more knowledge of
the sexual harassment policy their companies have put in place; it
is unnecessary to require an employee being harassed by someone
put in power over them to have to explain that the conduct is
unlawful.
In 2015, the Sixth Circuit, citing Ogden, held that “a demand
that a supervisor cease his/her harassing conduct constitutes
protected activity covered by Title VII.” 193 The Sixth Circuit also
chose to look no further than the language in the opposition clause
of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.194 The Sixth Circuit also
looked to the language used by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville &
Davidson County, Tennessee in determining that the term “oppose”
has a broad meaning, including to “resist.”195 Using the Supreme
Court’s definition of “oppose” to interpret Title VII, the Sixth Circuit
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (172).
189. Id.
190. See Watral, supra note 95, at 537–38 (stating “It is not sufficient that
the employee believe that the supervisor's conduct was objectively
unreasonable; she must also explain that she is objecting to the unlawful
behavior for the reason that the conduct violates Title VII.”).
191. Sitar v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir.
2003) (quoting Miller v. American Family Mutual Insurance, 203 F.3d 997, 1008
(7th Cir. 2000)).
192. Sitar involved an employee who complained to her supervisor that she
was being treated badly in her office. Sitar, 355 F.3d at 727. The court held that
poor treatment did not indicate she was being discriminated against because of
her gender. Id.
193. EEOC v. New Breed Logistics, 783 F.3d 1057, 1067 (6th Cir. 2015).
194. Id.
195. Id.; see also Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County,
555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009).
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held that demanding a supervisor stop harassing an employee
constitutes resisting harassment and therefore is a protected
activity under Title VII.196 The Sixth Circuit also pointed out that
other circuits have failed to address the language in the opposition
clause when reaching the conclusion that refusing sexual advances
is not a protected activity, and therefore found these rulings
unpersuasive.197
Further, as the Sixth Circuit elaborates, holding that rejecting
sexual harassment is a protected activity will not conflate
harassment and retaliation claims.198 Without a materially adverse
action, a harassment claim will never morph into a retaliation
claim.199 After all, the adverse employment action is the heart of a
retaliation claim; it is the “retaliation” portion of a retaliation
claim.200 Without an adverse action, one is left with a harassment
claim. They are two separate actions that will not be morphed
simply because refusing sexual advances is considered a protected
activity.
The remaining circuit courts should follow the reasoning set
forth in Ogden and New Breed Logistics, finding that rejecting
sexual advances from a supervisor is opposing an unlawful
employment practice and therefore is a protected activity for
purposes of a retaliation claim under Title VII. This is a clear
standard for district courts to follow, and it gives employees and
employers an answer when looking at whether valid retaliation
claims are possible. Without a clear standard, both employees and
employers are litigating retaliation claims without a clear direction
on their validity. It is important to solidify this issue to avoid
expensive litigation for plaintiffs who currently may not have valid
claims. It is also important for employers drafting sexual
harassment and anti-retaliation policies to know what is and what
is not a protected activity.201

196. New Breed Logistics,783 F.3d at 1067–68.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 721
(2nd Cir. 2010) (quoting Thomlison v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 99 Civ. 9539 (CM),
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18979, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2000)) (stating
“[a]ffirmative efforts to punish a complaining employee are at the heart of any
retaliation claim.”).
201. See Mark I. Schickman, Sexual Harassment, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION. (last visited Sept. 25, 2016). www.americanbar.org/newsletter/
publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_index/w96shi.html
(laying out the elements of a good sexual harassment policy: statement of policy,
definition, non-retaliation policy, specific terms for prevention, a reporting
procedure, and timely reporting requirement). A proper non-retaliation policy
and the reporting procedures could include the information regarding where
rejecting sexual harassment fits in. Id.
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CONCLUSION

Without direction from the Circuit Courts, inconsistent district
court rulings have left employees with no direction whether or not
they have a valid retaliation claim under Title VII for rebuffing
sexual advances. Therefore, it is important for the Circuit Courts to
begin to deal with this issue, rather than refusing to address it. In
addressing it, the Circuit Courts should follow the reasoning of the
Eighth and Sixth Circuits and many of the district courts in
determining that refusing sexual advances constitutes a protected
activity for a retaliatory discharge claim under Title VII.

